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Prosecuting in the magistrates’ courts in a time of austerity1 
Abstract: Summary proceedings in the magistrates’ courts have always been a quicker 
and cheaper way to process minor criminal cases, compared to trial by jury at the 
Crown Court. Research studies have shown how defence lawyers have made those 
cases routine so that they could be processed rapidly and cost-effectively through the 
system. However, there has been little research on how the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) deals with magistrates’ court cases. Basing its analysis upon direct observations 
and interviews with CPS staff, this paper examines the impact of efficiency concerns 
and recent budget cuts on the way cases are prosecuted by the CPS at the magistrates’ 
court. It shows how, taking advantage of routinised defence practices, most of the CPS 
magistrates’ court advocacy has been delegated to Associate Prosecutors (APs). This 
delegation to less-qualified personnel reinforces the bureaucratisation of summary 
justice as it is based on decisions being made in the prosecutor’s office, instead of open 
court. In practice, oversight by Crown Prosecutors is limited as the constraints of court 
advocacy run against the rules governing APs powers. 
 
Introduction 
Proceedings conducted in the magistrates’ courts have always provided a less complex 
and less expensive method of dealing with more minor criminal cases, compared to 
Crown Court proceedings.2 Instead of trial by jury, cases are dealt with by a bench of 
lay magistrates or a district judge. In 2000, Belloni and Hodgson estimated that “[e]ach 
contested case heard in Crown Court costs roughly £12,000 more than it would have 
done if tried by magistrates”.3 There have been longstanding political and judicial 
                                                 
1 I would like to express my thanks to the staff at the CPS office who generously welcomed me and gave 
up their time for this research despite all the considerable pressures on them, and to their managers 
who gave permission for this. I must also thank the editor and reviewers of this journal, as well as 
Jacqueline Hodgson for their comments. Any remaining error and inaccuracy are entirely my fault. 
2 Rod Morgan, ‘Summary Justice, Fast - but Fair?’ (Centre For Crime and Justice Studies 2008) 
<https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/summary-justice-fast-fair> accessed 22 April 2017. 
3 Frank Belloni and Jacqueline Hodgson, Criminal Injustice an Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process 
in Britain (Palgrave, 2000) 115. This £12,000 figure seems to come directly from the report of the 1993 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice which cites estimates calculated by the Home Office Research 
and Planning Unit. These estimates include ‘costs to the Crown Court and magistrates’ courts services 
(excluding capital costs in both cases), criminal legal aid costs, and costs to the Crown Prosecution 
Service, to the Probation Service by virtue of their work in the courts, and prison escort costs. The 
Crown Court trial costs include the cost of committal proceedings which have preceded the trial.’ 
Viscount Runciman of Doxford, ‘The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. Report’ (1993) Cm 2263 5. 
The costs of trials are difficult to estimate, but more recent figures suggest the differential remains 
significant: a 2016 report by the National Audit Office estimates that Crown Court cases ‘cost an average 
of £1,900 per day for staff, judicial and juror costs, compared with £1,150 in a magistrates’ court.’ 
(National Audit Office, ‘Efficiency in the Criminal Justice System’ 10.); the CPS scales of cost for 
application for costs against convicted defendants provide guidance on the level of costs incurred by the 
CPS for cases committed to the Crown Court for trial: on average, £3,500 (compared to £965 for an 
either-way trial at the magistrates’ court): see <http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/costs/annex_1_-
_scales_of_cost/> accessed 24 July 2017. 
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efforts to increase the scope of summary jurisdiction and restrict the right of 
defendants to choose trial by jury, largely because of concerns around the cost and 
length of Crown Court proceedings. Cammiss traces legislative reforms increasing 
summary jurisdiction as far back as 1847, always motivated by the reduction of delay 
and the saving of resources.4 More recently, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 reclassified 
four either-way offences as ‘summary only’ and s. 176 (1) Anti-social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 also made low value shoplifting a summary offence.5 
Furthermore, s. 154 Criminal Justice Act 2003 will increase the sentencing powers of 
magistrates (if and when it comes into force), in an effort to keep cases in the 
magistrates’ courts. In 1993, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (RCCJ) chaired 
by Lord Runciman recommended that the right to jury trial be removed in cases 
triable ‘either way’, explicitly justifying the recommendation in terms of cost.6 Further 
proposals to remove the right to elect Crown Court trial were made in the Narey 
report (1997),7 the Auld review (2001)8 and the Leveson review (2015).9 
Criminal justice scholars have long criticised this increase in the magistrates’ caseload 
as summary proceedings are arguably less testing for the prosecution case than trial by 
jury. Marsh thus argues that “magistrates’ courts reflect a rapid ‘assembly-line’ 
approach to the disposals of cases”.10 This is problematic, particularly in a broadly 
adversarial system where the truth is supposed to come out from the confrontation of 
the prosecution case to the defence case. Not testing out the prosecution case more 
robustly means that convictions are based on a partial account of the facts and could 
potentially lead to miscarriages of justice. Acquittal rates remain higher in the Crown 
Court, than in the magistrates’ courts,11 giving some substance to the belief held by 
defendants and defence lawyers that there is a bias in favour of the prosecution in 
magistrates’ courts.12 This view of magistrates’ courts as merely rubber-stamping 
decisions made by prosecutors is compounded by ethnographic studies which have 
shown how defence solicitors fail to build a defence case and therefore to present any 
                                                 
4 Steven Cammiss, ‘“I Will in a Moment Give You the Full History”: Mode of Trial, Prosecutorial Control 
and Partial Accounts’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 38, 38–39. 
5 Although adult defendants can still elect Crown Court trial, in which case the offence is no longer 
summary. 
6 Runciman of Doxford (n 3) 85, 87–88; for a critique of this proposal, see, for instance, Stewart Field 
and Philip A Thomas, ‘Justice and Efficiency? The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice’ (1994) 21 
Journal of Law and Society 1, 9; Lee Bridges, ‘Normalizing Injustice: The Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice’ (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 20; Andrew Ashworth, ‘Plea, Venue and Discontinuance’ 
[1993] Criminal Law Review 830; Belloni and Hodgson (n 3) 116–118. 
7 Martin Narey, Review of Delay in the Criminal Justice System: A Report (Home Office 1997). 
8 Robin Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Report (Stationery Office 2001). 
9 Brian Leveson, ‘Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings’ (Judiciary of England and Wales 2015) 87. 
10 Luke Marsh, ‘Leveson’s Narrow Pursuit of Justice’ (2016) 45 Common Law World Review 51, 60. 
11 The latest CPS statistics give an acquittal rate of 14.4 percent in the magistrates’ courts 
(discontinuances, including bind overs, dismissals no case to answer and dismissals after trial), against 
19.6 percent in the Crown Court (judge-ordered acquittals including bind overs, judge-directed 
acquittals and acquittals after trial): see Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015-
16’ (2016) 59–61 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2015_16.pdf> accessed 20 
June 2017. 
12 Carol Hedderman and David Moxon, ‘Magistrates’ Court or Crown Court? Mode of Trial Decisions 
and Sentencing’ (Home Office 1992) Home Office Research Study No. 125 20; see also AE Bottoms and 
JD McClean, Defendants in the Criminal Process (Routledge 1976). 
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opposition to the prosecution case. McConville et al showed how, in order to enable 
the quick and cost-effective processing of cases through the system, defendants are 
placed under intense pressure by their own lawyer to plead guilty.13 A 2013 empirical 
study by Newman14 shows that their findings continue to reflect current defence 
lawyer practices. 
Little research has been done on how the CPS prosecutes cases at the magistrates’ 
court, especially in the current context of budget cuts and increased focus on 
efficiency savings for criminal justice agencies. This paper draws on insights from 
empirical data collected in 2012 for my PhD, a comparative study of prosecutorial 
discretion and accountability in France and England and Wales. Data was collected 
during a 4-month period of direct observation at a CPS office in a large English city 
(covering the city’s magistrates’ court, as well as two magistrates’ courts in 
neighbouring towns).15 I spent a month going to court with CPS staff, observing over 
260 hearings at the magistrates’ court. I then spent another month observing how 
reviews in preparation for trial at the magistrates’ court were conducted in the office. 
Despite several attempts, I was only able to attend two full trials as many cases 
originally listed for trial ended in guilty pleas or were discontinued by the CPS. In 
addition, I carried out semi-structured interviews with thirty-one CPS staff in total, 
including five Associate Prosecutors (out of a total of thirteen working in the office), 
three paralegal officers (out of five), five Crown Prosecutors who worked mainly in the 
magistrates’ court team16 and the two District Crown Prosecutors who headed the 
magistrates’ court team. It is important not to overstate the findings of this study 
given its limitations to a single CPS office, as well as constant change in prosecuting 
practices. Nevertheless, this research provides important insights into the effect of 
decreasing resources on the allocation of tasks in a CPS office and the impact of this 
allocation on the wider criminal justice system. 
In this paper, I show how most of the CPS’ magistrates’ court workload has been 
delegated to Associate Prosecutors (APs), with limited oversight by Crown 
Prosecutors. After having presented the context in which this delegation is taking 
place and how these personnel are selected and trained, I argue that this delegation is 
enabled by, but also reinforces the bureaucratisation of summary justice, pushing all 
decision-making back to the prosecutor’s office, instead of open court. Furthermore, 
although APs have limited powers in theory and can only exercise them under the 
supervision of Crown Prosecutors, the limits to their powers are in tension with 
efficiency objectives. In practice, the rules framing the powers of APs are simply 
unworkable as concerns over flexibility and speed appear to overcome the need for 
                                                 
13 Mike McConville and others, Standing Accused: The Organisation and Practices of Criminal Defence 
Lawyers in Britain (Clarendon Press 1994) ch 10; see also Aogan Mulcahy, ‘The Justification of Justice - 
Legal Practitioners’ Accounts of Negotiated Case Settlements in Magistrates’ Courts’ (1994) 34 British 
Journal of Criminology 411; Contra Max Travers, The Reality of Law: Work and Talk in a Firm of Criminal 
Lawyers (Ashgate 1997). 
14 Daniel Newman, Legal Aid Lawyers and the Quest for Justice (Hart Publishing 2013). 
15 The majority of my observations were conducted in the city’s magistrates’ court 
16 Crown Prosecutors rotated between different teams (charging team, magistrates’ court team, Crown 
Court team). During my fieldwork however, the same Crown Prosecutors tended to be attached to the 
magistrates’ court team and I therefore chose five of them for interviews. 
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accountability. Crown Prosecutors only have limited oversight, due to the constraints 
of court advocacy and efficiency concerns. 
Context 
Efficiency concerns are nothing new at the CPS, which began operating in 1987. 
Around the same time, the managerialist agenda started its ascendency in the 
administration of public agencies, although the arrival of managerialism in criminal 
justice was slower than in other parts of the UK public sector.17 Introducing the private 
sector’s managerial methods to the public sector, ‘New Public Management’ – as it is 
often referred to – places performance at the heart of the criminal justice system, 
usually at the expense of professionals’ discretion.18 Introduced by the Conservative 
government in 1979, the managerialist strategy was fully supported and taken up 
further by New Labour. Tellingly, official reviews of the criminal justice system have 
all focused on efficiency in recent years.19 From 2010, the austerity policy pursued by 
the incoming Conservative government increased the pressure on criminal justice 
agencies, CPS included, to become more efficient following budget cuts. The CPS saw 
its budget cut by 26 percent between 2009-10 and 2015-16.20 Although its workload has 
decreased – due, in part, to some transfers of prosecution powers in the magistrates’ 
courts to the police –,21 the CPS has still had to find substantial efficiency savings in 
recent years. 
In order ‘to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the magistrates’ courts systems 
and processes’,22 the CPS introduced the Optimum Business Model in 200823 which 
                                                 
17 Carol Jones, ‘Auditing Criminal Justice’ (1993) 33 British Journal of Criminology 187; Nicola Lacey, 
‘Government as Manager, Citizen as Consumer: The Case of the Criminal Justice Act 1991’ (1994) 57 The 
Modern Law Review 534; John W Raine and Michael J Willson, ‘Beyond Managerialism in Criminal 
Justice’ (1997) 36 The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 80; Ian Brownlee, ‘New Labour - New 
Penology - Punitive Rhetoric and the Limits of Managerialism in Criminal Justice Policy’ (1998) 25 
Journal of Law and Society 313; Eugene McLaughlin and John Muncie, ‘The Criminal Justice System: 
New Labour’s New Partnerships’ in John Clarke, Sharon Gewirtz and Eugene McLaughlin (eds), New 
managerialism, new welfare? (SAGE 2000); Lee Bridges, ‘Toward a Culture of Complacency – Criminal 
Justice under New Labour’ (2010) 79 Criminal Justice Matters 22; Ed Cape, ‘Adversarialism “Lite”: 
Developments in Criminal Procedure and Evidence under New Labour’ (2010) 79 Criminal Justice 
Matters 25; Jenny McEwan, ‘From Adversarialism to Managerialism: Criminal Justice in Transition’ 
(2011) 31 Legal Studies 519. 
18 Raine and Willson (n 16) 82–83; McEwan (n 16) 522. 
19 Runciman of Doxford (n 3) paras 16–19; Narey (n 6); Auld (n 7); Leveson (n 8). 
20 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15’, p. 74 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2014_15.pdf> and Crown Prosecution Service, 
‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16’, p. 65 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2015_16.pdf> accessed 1 May 2017. 
21 Whilst in 2005-06, the CPS prosecuted over a million cases in the magistrates’ courts, their caseload 
fell to just over 538,000 cases in 2015-16: Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Resource 
Accounts’, p. 86 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annualreport08.pdf>; Crown Prosecution 
Service, Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16, p. 57 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2015_16.pdf> accessed 1 May 2017. 
22 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2010-11’ (2011) HC 1000 14 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/> accessed 26 June 2017. 
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resulted in the fragmentation of the prosecution process, as cases are no longer 
allocated to individual Crown Prosecutors, but to teams. Somewhat reminiscent of an 
assembly line, the prosecution process was divided into a number of micro-decisions 
and I observed CPS staff carry out the same narrowly defined routine tasks on files 
that entered the system, without an overview of the whole process. Interestingly, the 
lack of ownership of cases by a named lawyer was criticised by Leveson in his 2015 
review of the criminal justice system as an obstacle to efficient case management,24 
suggesting that efficiency for one agency does not necessarily align with efficiency for 
the whole system. 
This organisation of the CPS is enabled by the division of the criminal justice process 
into several stages: charge, pre-trial hearings, trial, and sentencing. Following the 
police investigation and the charge, all cases start with a first hearing at the 
magistrates’ court. The majority of cases are finalised there, but the most serious ones 
are sent to the Crown Court for trial and/or sentence. Files can enter the CPS process 
prior to the suspect being charged if the police seek CPS charging advice25 or just 
before the first hearing at the magistrates’ court.26 Pre-charge advice, advocacy at 
various court hearings, and preparation for trial are distinct stages in the process and 
each is completed by a different member of staff, except in cases of rape, serious sexual 
assaults or child abuse cases, or in cases that are too complex or where the evidence is 
too voluminous to be dealt with in a short period of time. The division of the 
prosecution process into individual tasks results in a compartmentalisation of work, 
which has in turn facilitated the delegation of part of the prosecution workload to less 
qualified personnel. 
In a 1999 article, Kritzer describes what happened to skilled craftspeople during the 
Industrial Revolution and draws a parallel with what is happening to the legal 
profession in modern societies: 
The rationalization of the production process, combined with the invention 
of machines, eventually led to the development of the factory. Industrialists 
were able to isolate the individual tasks needed for production and then 
hire workers each with just enough skill to carry out one or several of those 
tasks. The result was cheaper production of goods, a shift from human 
capital in the form of skilled craftspeople to industrial capital, and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2007-08’ (2008) HC 538 16 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crown-prosecution-service-annual-report-and-
resource-accounts-for-the-period-2007-to-2008> accessed 5 July 2017. 
24 Leveson (n 8) 9. 
25 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 gave the DPP the power to issue guidance on charging which police 
officers and prosecutors must comply with. The DPP’s guidance lists the offences that can be charged 
by the police alone and those where they must seek the advice of Crown prosecutors. See DPP’s 
charging guidance <http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpp_guidance_5.html> 
accessed 1 May 2017. 
26 See below for the proportion of cases where advice is sought and those that enter just before the first 
hearing (n 44). 
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effective end of many crafts except for highly specialized or artistic 
applications.27 
Having ‘rationalised’ the prosecution process as described above, some of the tasks 
previously carried out by Crown Prosecutors have been reallocated to ‘cheaper’ CPS 
personnel, i.e. APs. Thus, in the magistrates’ court team, APs prosecuted cases at 
court. 
The obvious benefit for the CPS in allocating staff to specific stages in the process 
rather than to cases and in diverting some prosecutorial tasks away from Crown 
Prosecutors is the prospect of processing more cases with the same or even fewer staff. 
This is particularly attractive in a context of budget cuts. One of the ways the CPS 
profess to save money is by ‘maximising the use of paralegal staff’.28 Employing APs, 
rather than qualified solicitors or barristers to prosecute in court, is cheaper and also 
frees up qualified lawyers to do other work.29 Thus, the National Audit Office noted in 
a 2006 report that ‘[i]n 2004-05, magistrates’ courts scheduled only enough cases to 
occupy designated case workers30 for 60 per cent of their time; increasing this to 80 
per cent would release the equivalent of 33 lawyers for other work and achieve savings 
of £2.3 million.’31 Thus, to increase the number of magistrates’ courts hearings covered 
by APs was a CPS performance target in 2008.32 
Selection and Training 
The delegation of advocacy in the magistrates’ courts to APs stems from the 
expectation that legal issues are not resolved at court and that Crown Prosecutors are 
therefore not needed there, because major legal decisions can be made in the office. If 
the defendant pleads guilty to the offence s/he is charged with in the first hearing and 
the case is suitable for sentence in the magistrates’ court, the role of the CPS 
representative is limited to reading the police summary before mitigation by the 
defence, so that the magistrates or the district judge can pass sentence. In those 
straightforward cases, no legal decision is made at court by the prosecution and it is 
perhaps understandable that the CPS has sought to save resources by redeploying 
Crown Prosecutors to review cases in the office, rather than in court and using APs to 
                                                 
27 Herbert M Kritzer, ‘The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a 
Postprofessional World’ (1999) 33 Law & Society Review 713, 723–724. 
28 ‘The responsibility for continuous improvement in the coming year lies primarily with the 13 Areas, 
which will be looking to further increase efficiency by reducing the number of administrative tasks that 
need to be undertaken and maximising the use of paralegal staff to support our prosecutions’, 
‘Optimum Business Model and Paralegal Career Family Structure’, in ‘CPS Annual Report and Resource 
Accounts 2010-2011’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/optimum_business_model.html> accessed 1 May 
2017. 
29 Another advantage is that it provides new career progression opportunities for non-legal staff at the 
CPS. 
30 Associate Prosecutors used to be called ‘designated case workers’ prior to the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008. 
31 National Audit Office, Crown Prosecution Service: Effective Use of Magistrates’ Courts Hearings 
(Stationery Office 2006) 4 <http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/02/0506798.pdf> 
accessed 1 May 2017. 
32 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2007-08’ (n 22) 12. 
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carry out relatively routine and predictable work. In this section, I will examine how 
APs are selected and trained by the CPS. 
APs are empowered to represent the CPS at most hearings in the magistrates’ courts. 
The Crime and Disorder Act 199833 increased their powers beyond the presentation of 
bail applications to the conduct of certain criminal proceedings in magistrates’ courts. 
They present the prosecution case to magistrates and make representations on mode 
of trial, bail, and sentencing. APs also prosecute cases in the youth court where they 
can present ‘grave crime’ arguments,34 so that the case is committed to the Crown 
Court. Specially trained APs, known as Level 2 Associate Prosecutors (AP2s), are 
permitted to prosecute trials in summary only, non-imprisonable offences, such as 
road traffic offences. The work delegated to APs therefore includes almost all advocacy 
work at the magistrates’ court, with Crown Prosecutors being confined to the (rare) 
trials for imprisonable offences. 
Some of the APs I observed were qualified solicitors or barristers who had not been 
able to secure posts as Crown Prosecutor or Crown Advocate, although being a 
solicitor or a barrister is not a requirement to become an AP. Instead, APs are selected 
amongst CPS staff who have ‘experience of casework within the criminal justice system 
or of lay presentation’35 and ‘a working knowledge of criminal law and its application, 
magistrates’ courts procedure and the criminal justice system’.36 In the CPS office I 
observed, several APs had been working for the CPS for over 25 years as administrative 
and/or paralegal staff, and none of them had less than seven years’ experience at the 
CPS. Once selected, APs undertake a two-week training programme: the first week is a 
foundation course in legal principles and the second week is an advocacy course. They 
have to pass an independent assessment of competence before being authorised to 
practice as an AP. They also undertake further training for bail applications, youth 
courts, and domestic violence. APs are accredited and regulated through the 
Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. 
Although many APs I interviewed described the training course as ‘intense’ (EW-8, 
EW-5),37 some were conscious that it could not compare to a law degree: ‘a week 
worth of law, it skims over everything very quickly’ (EW-10). Theoretical training is 
complemented by shadowing more experienced colleagues at court for several weeks 
(both prior and during the completion of the initial training course).38 All the APs I 
                                                 
33 Section 53. 
34 Exceptionally, cases involving grave crimes (defined in section 91(1) Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000) can be tried at the Crown Court, rather than a youth court, if magistrates 
consider that a custodial sentence exceeding two years is likely to be imposed following conviction. 
Prosecutors should assist the court in determining the appropriate venue, in particular by informing the 
court of the aggravating and mitigating features of the offence. 
35 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annex D – Associate Prosecutors Training and Selection’, in ‘CPS Annual 
Report and Resource Accounts 2010-2011’ 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/annex_d.html> accessed 2 May 2017. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Participants and cases are coded by the letters EW (for England and Wales) and a number (i.e. EW-
126). 
38 See the ‘Associate Prosecutor Rights of Audience and Litigation Certification Rules’ on ILEX website 
at <http://www.cilexregulation.org.uk/~/media/pdf_documents/cilex-regulation/rules/associate-
prosecutor-rights-of-audience-and-litigation-certification-rules.pdf?la=en> accessed 22 May 2017. 
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interviewed were confident they could prosecute cases in the magistrates’ court as a 
result of the initial training and their experience at court. This might be true of the 
more routine and predictable work they are trained to carry out, but it becomes more 
difficult when the defence unexpectedly opposes the prosecution case as I will show 
below. 
The bureaucratisation of magistrates’ court’s hearings 
The assumption that magistrates’ court work is routine and predictable is backed up 
by statistics which show that the vast majority of defendants (76 per cent in 2015-16)39 
plead guilty. Furthermore, McConville et al and showed that, contrary to expectations 
in an adversarial system, applications by the prosecution often go unopposed.40 
Newman’s 2013 empirical study echoed the findings of McConville et al, underlining 
the continuing prevalence of passive defence, in contradiction with the active role 
presented by defence lawyers in formal interviews.41 The ability of APs to represent the 
prosecution at magistrates’ court hearings, without challenge or having facts or 
evidence issues contested, is contingent on defence lawyers behaving in non-
adversarial ways, processing their clients towards a guilty plea and not opposing 
applications by the prosecution. However, the absence of Crown Prosecutors at the 
magistrates’ court also reinforces the bureaucratisation of summary proceedings, given 
that legal issues cannot be resolved at court should the defence wish to act in a more 
adversarial manner. 
The extent to which defence lawyers facilitate the routinised nature of the prosecution 
function, as it necessarily is when carried out by APs, becomes evident when 
defendants are not represented, which is increasingly the case given cuts to legal aid. 
For instance, in case EW-262, the defendant was charged with harassment, but he was 
not represented in court and was determined to contest the prosecution case. After he 
entered not guilty pleas, the AP decided to apply for special measures for the 
complainants, to stop the defendant from cross-examining them himself if he was not 
represented at trial. Asked why she wanted to make this application, she justified it by 
the nature of the allegations, but the district judge pressed her for more details. She 
read the charges, but the judge was not satisfied this was a proper application for 
special measures. The court’s legal adviser tried to come to her rescue by telling her 
the criteria for such application. The judge asked the AP to provide specific reasons in 
support of her application to forbid the defendant to cross-examine the complainants 
and, when she was unable to provide them, requested that a Crown Prosecutor review 
the matter. 
Discussing this deeply embarrassing moment with the AP after the hearing, she told 
me that she had never before had to make a formal application to the court as it was 
always granted without further questions. Although unusual,42 this case illustrates 
how the presence of defence lawyers normally ensures that applications are granted 
                                                 
39 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual Report and Accounts 2015-16’ (n 10). 
40 McConville and others (n 12). 
41 Newman (n 13). 
42 I only witnessed one such incident, but the vast majority of defendants were represented at the time 
of my fieldwork. 
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without further probing, the judge presumably assuming that the defence lawyer 
would raise an objection if they wished to oppose the application. Defence lawyers 
therefore do not simply facilitate the delegation of prosecutorial tasks to less qualified 
CPS staff, but also legitimate the passive role of the bench in proceedings by their 
mere presence. 
The absence of Crown Prosecutors from court reinforces the bureaucratisation of 
summary proceedings as legal issues cannot be resolved at court in the cases where 
defence lawyers – or defendants themselves – take a more adversarial stance. They are 
often only in contact with APs who – officially – do not have the powers to make 
decisions on legal issues.43 This means that defence lawyers have to write to the CPS to 
query legal aspects of a case. Crown Prosecutors are not allocated to specific cases, but 
are given a list of tasks across several files to deal with. The defence query will 
therefore be dealt with by someone unfamiliar with the case or the issues involved in 
it. Despite their lack of knowledge of the case in its entirety, these lawyers are asked to 
answer legal queries from the defence. This could lead to further inefficiencies, with 
Crown Prosecutors reviewing cases which have already been reviewed by other 
colleagues, or to mistakes with decisions made without all relevant information. 
The CPS is not directly responsible for the bureaucratisation of magistrates’ court 
proceedings, but it contributes to it, by preventing the resolution of some cases at 
court. As a result, the magistrates’ court merely rubber stamps decisions made outside 
of court, often in the CPS office. The examples above show that the absence of Crown 
Prosecutors from court and their replacement by APs can lead to inefficiencies too, as 
cases which require legal decisions have to be adjourned to a later date, so that they 
can be reviewed by a Crown Prosecutor. Tensions arise between efficiency objectives 
and concerns that all major legal decisions, in particular the amendment of charges or 
the acceptance of pleas, are made by fully qualified Crown Prosecutors. The rules 
limiting the powers of APs prove to be unworkable in practice: the oversight exercised 
by Crown Prosecutors over APs’ decisions is weak and I observed APs breach those 
rules on a daily basis, with the full knowledge of their superiors, due to a lack of 
resources to deal with the heavy caseload. 
Weak oversight by Crown Prosecutors 
Even in cases where the defence does not oppose all of the prosecution case, it might 
be necessary for the prosecution to make legal decisions, i.e. accept a guilty plea to a 
lower charge or discontinue some of the charges in exchange for guilty pleas to others. 
APs are not permitted to do so, unless they seek instructions from a Crown 
Prosecutor. Although authorising APs to engage in plea negotiations would be 
consistent with efficiency, this is theoretically outweighed by concerns to ensure that 
major legal decisions and those around case disposal are taken only by Crown 
Prosecutors. Section 7A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 states that APs have 
‘the powers and rights of audience of a Crown Prosecutor in relation to (...) the 
conduct of criminal proceedings in magistrates’ courts other than trials’. The law 
specifies that APs ‘shall exercise any such powers subject to instructions given to 
                                                 
43 See below for an analysis of how APs routinely breach the rules in practice. 
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[them] by the [DPP]’. According to paragraph 3.5 of the DPP’s instructions to APs, 
‘APs exercise these powers and rights of audience on the instructions of a Crown 
Prosecutor (...)’44 (emphasis added). In reviewing magistrates’ court cases, Schedule 4 
of the DPP’s instructions states that APs have the power to make only minor 
amendments to the charge or summons. 
Employing less-qualified staff to prosecute at court is not necessarily detrimental if 
cases are pre-determined by Crown Prosecutors in the office, although it can result in 
a lack of reactivity in court. If there is no authority on file to indicate which pleas 
would be acceptable, APs must seek authorisation prior to accepting a plea. In 
practice, however, Crown Prosecutors have only weak oversight over the work of APs 
at court. This is due to the reality of court advocacy – which does not always allow APs 
to interrupt proceedings in order to ring the office for instructions – and the 
overreliance by CPS management on APs seeking guidance, rather than a clear 
structure of supervision. Importantly, although I have used the word ‘delegation’, in 
fact cases are not reviewed by a Crown Prosecutor to decide whether it is suitable to 
pass on to an AP. Instead, they are divided up by administrators according to set 
criteria. This distribution of tasks relies on APs identifying cases that they believe 
should be brought to the attention of a Crown Prosecutor because of legal issues. Even 
in these cases, Crown Prosecutors often do not review the case file themselves due to 
time constraints, instead relying on the AP’s account of the case. 
Paragraph 3.6 of the Code for Crown Prosecutors insists that ‘[p]rosecutors review 
every case they receive from the police or other investigators’. However, the CPS only 
provides charging advice in a minority of cases, mostly in more serious or complex 
cases. In the vast majority of summary cases, the police can charge the defendant 
without reference to the CPS.45 APs can therefore be the first CPS staff to review the 
charge when the case comes before the magistrates’ court for the first hearing. If the 
defendant pleads guilty and is sentenced at that hearing, the case will not be reviewed 
further, unless the AP refers it to a Crown Prosecutor. Thus, in many instances, a case 
will be dealt with entirely by an AP – from pre-trial review to court presentation. Cases 
at the magistrates’ court are prosecuted in the name of the CPS, but no Crown 
Prosecutor will have read the case, or made any decision concerning its treatment and 
disposal. This is particularly significant given that CPS review of cases charged by the 
police was a major reason for establishing the CPS in the first place.46 
If the case has benefited from CPS advice prior to charging, a Crown Prosecutor will 
have reviewed the case at this stage. CPS charging lawyers should then endorse the file 
                                                 
44 These instructions are available on the CPS website 
<http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpp_instructions.html> accessed 26 July 2017. 
45 In 2013, the CPS estimated that ‘the police are responsible for approximately 71.5% of all charging 
decisions, with the CPS responsible for the remaining 28.5%.’ Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Annual 
Report and Accounts 2012-13’ (2013) HC 31 7 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crown-
prosecution-service-annual-report-and-accounts-2012-to-2013> accessed 26 June 2017. 
The latest edition of the Director’s Guidance on Charging released in May 2013 limited the CPS remit on 
charging further, for instance returning charging powers to the police in cases of theft (shoplifting) 
without reference to the CPS where a not guilty plea is anticipated and the case is suitable to be dealt 
with in the magistrates’ court (the police could already charge these offences where a guilty plea is 
anticipated). 
46 Andrew Sanders, ‘The CPS - 30 Years On’ [2016] Criminal Law Review 82, 87. 
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to give instructions to the prosecuting advocate with regards to acceptable pleas. If a 
not guilty plea is anticipated, charging lawyers should also prepare the case 
management form to advise what evidence will be needed at trial to support the 
prosecution case, i.e. which witnesses should be called to give evidence and/or 
whether hearsay, bad character, special measures applications/notices are necessary. 
The form must be filled out by both the defence and the prosecution to establish the 
legal issues in the case at the magistrates’ court hearing. Importantly, the form is later 
used in the CPS by paralegal officers to process the necessary applications/notices 
prior to trial. Case management decisions should therefore have the input of a Crown 
Prosecutor, at least in certain cases. However, APs told me that they rarely received 
the completed form, either because charging lawyers failed to fill it out or because 
administrative staff did not attach it to the court bundle. In any case, one AP told me 
that he preferred to fill it out himself as he needed to sign it and did not think that 
charging lawyers filled it out correctly. 
The practical reality of magistrates’ courts’ listings drives APs to breach procedure by 
accepting pleas without the prior authorisation of a Crown Prosecutor. Where an offer 
to plead guilty to a lesser offence than charged is made by the defence but there is no 
authority on file for APs to accept it, it is not practical for them to ask the court for 
time to consult with a superior by phone. Even when a District Crown Prosecutor was 
on duty to answer queries from APs at court – which was every day in the area I 
observed – APs confirmed in interviews that practical constraints meant they had to 
bend the rules. 
We’re not meant to accept any basis of plea. (...) That’s a technicality. The 
thing is you’ve got to use your common sense over there because, to a 
certain degree, you just have to, otherwise you’d be stopping every two 
minutes to make a phone call to the office. [Interview respondent EW10] 
Several APs told me in interviews that, with experience, they knew which pleas were 
acceptable. They were confident that their managers would back them up when they 
returned to the office. 
We’re quite lucky that our management back us up completely. Basically, 
you can make decisions at court, even though you’re probably not supposed 
to make decisions at court, but you can in the knowledge that you’re going 
to be backed up on it.47 Because clearly, we’re all stretched, there’s not 
enough staff, you can’t always get hold of somebody. They might be talking 
to someone else and you might only be allowed to stand the case down for 
five minutes.(...) I think when you’ve been in the job long enough you know 
what would rock the boat and what wouldn’t. [Interview respondent EW6] 
As can be seen clearly in this last comment, resource constraints limiting the 
availability of CPS lawyers are part of the reason why APs make decisions at court 
instead of asking for prior authorisation from a lawyer as they are legally required to. 
That pressure is exacerbated by the practical reality of court listings which preclude 
APs being given the time to ring the office. Importantly, this is done with the full 
knowledge of managers. I attended a team meeting during which the manager, whilst 
                                                 
47 Similar views were expressed by interview respondent EW7. 
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acknowledging that APs were not supposed to make the decisions to accept pleas or 
not, said that he was ‘grateful’ that they did as it avoided files being brought back to 
the office for a review to take place, thus further underlining the unworkable nature of 
the procedure in place for APs. Whilst Crown Prosecutors reviewing cases in the office 
often see their decisions reviewed, it is more difficult to review decisions to accept 
pleas as they are taken at court, in the heat of the moment, and will not be reviewed 
by others later in the process, since the case is finalised. 
Further contradicting the notion that decisions are taken in CPS offices by Crown 
Prosecutors, I witnessed APs make pivotal decisions in court, fundamentally altering 
the fate of cases. APs often requested amendments to charges or the complete 
redrafting of them, sometimes in complete contradiction with the charging advice 
given to the police by a Crown Prosecutor. In case EW-230 where the charging lawyer 
had only authorised two charges of common assault, the AP added a charge of 
kidnapping. This was despite the fact that the charging lawyer had considered a 
kidnapping charge, but had expressly rejected it, as the AP admitted to me. Since 
kidnapping is an indictable-only offence, a case which originally involved two 
summary charges and should have been tried at the magistrates’ court was sent to the 
Crown Court for trial. 
The amendment of charges was particularly prevalent in cases of assaults where the 
charging lawyer had opted for a common assault charge, but where the AP favoured a 
more serious charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH) or even grievous 
bodily harm (GBH), because the defendant was alleged to have used a weapon: 
In case EW-329, a defendant was charged with an assault on a doctor who refused to 
give him medication. He was alleged to have grabbed a chair, lifted it in the air and 
brought it back down towards the doctor’s head. The doctor had put his arms up to 
protect himself and the chair hit his hand, causing a cut. At first, the doctor thought it 
might need stitches, but it was treated with steri-strips. The police had proposed to 
charge the defendant with ABH, but the charging lawyer only authorised a charge for 
common assault. She properly applied the Charging Standards on offences against the 
person,48 which require prosecutors to base their decisions on the level of injury and 
the likely sentence, rather than the circumstances of the assault. She had specifically 
addressed the issue of the chair used as a weapon in her charging advice – ‘a weapon 
was used, the chair, but it was instantaneous and the level of injury was a cut that bled 
requiring steri-strips’ –, but had concluded that the magistrates’ sentencing powers 
were sufficient in this case. Nonetheless, the charge was changed back to ABH by the 
AP prosecuting at court who made representations to the magistrates that the case 
was not suitable for summary trial. The defendant pleaded guilty to it and was sent to 
Crown Court for sentence. 
These examples are complete reversals of decisions made by Crown Prosecutors in 
blatant disregard of the limits of the AP’s role. Although these changes can be 
‘authorised’ by Crown Prosecutors, these authorisations come from people who have 
not reviewed the file to the extent the charging lawyer has, but are simply asked for 
their opinion before the AP leaves for court. Further insight into why APs amend 
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charges was given by the response of one AP I interviewed, when asked for his view on 
CPS policies and guidance: 
I suppose, from our point of view, we would look at that [guidance] but 
some of it is, sort of, gut reaction from being in court day-in, day-out. 
Somebody who’s at home or in their office making a decision on an assault 
case would say “oh well, hit somebody over the head with a hammer, still 
not serious injury, so section 39”49 and sort of looking at the Charging 
Guidelines it talks about level of injury and everything like that... But, we 
would say in the office “well, that clearly makes it more serious, it’s 
aggravated (…)” and so we would sometimes go against the Charging 
Standards because... because of the court’s view on that type of case which 
would mean that the sentence is going to be greater than what a section 39 
would allow. 
The amendment of charges by APs thus runs against efforts by the CPS to make 
decision-making more consistent and principled through the implementation of 
policies, such as the Charging Standards for offences against the person. 
Conclusion 
The Criminal Procedure Rules provide that dealing with a case justly includes dealing 
with the case efficiently and expeditiously. As Sanders argues, ‘justice and democracy 
in criminal justice cannot be pursued unconditionally, for resources are not unlimited 
and other public services have equally legitimate demands on the same resource-
pool.’50 However, efficiency concerns should not override defence rights. Summary 
proceedings must strike a balance between dealing with minor criminal cases 
expeditiously, but also fairly. This paper has examined the way the CPS prosecute 
cases in the magistrates’ courts. Given that previous studies have shown that defence 
lawyers often do not meet adversarial expectations, particularly at the magistrates’ 
court, it argues that the CPS has taken advantage of this state of affairs in a context of 
economic austerity. 
The prosecution process at the CPS was rationalised through the introduction of the 
Optimum Business Model which allocates narrowly defined tasks to CPS staff. This 
segmentation of the process enables the delegation of some of these tasks from Crown 
Prosecutors to less qualified personnel. Thus, in the CPS office observed in 2012, 
advocacy at the magistrates’ court was undertaken by APs for most hearings. The 
introduction of these resource-saving measures is facilitated by the lack of opposition 
to the prosecution case and thus the absence of any legal issue on guilt to be 
adjudicated in the majority of cases. The presence of defence lawyers merely serves to 
preserve the legitimacy of the process by providing the appearance of checks on the 
prosecution case. 
Given the limits to the powers of APs, these measures also reinforce the 
bureaucratisation of summary proceedings by preventing the resolution of legal issues 
                                                 
49 Common assault and battery are charged under section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
50 Sanders (n 45) 83. 
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at court and thus conflict with efficiency objectives. In this paper, I have shown how 
APs apparently routinely breach the rules framing their powers by accepting pleas 
offered by defence lawyers without authorisation from Crown Prosecutors, but with 
the full knowledge of CPS managers. Concerns over flexibility and speed appear to 
overcome the need for accountability. My research also reveals how APs amend 
charges in contradiction with the decision made by the CPS at the charging stage, 
strongly affecting the outcome of cases. 
A larger scale empirical research project would be necessary to determine whether or 
not data collected in this study are representative of the reality in all CPS offices, 
rather than specific to the local site observed. APs are accredited and regulated by 
ILEX, with legal executives being described as the third branch of the legal 
profession.51 They cannot therefore be described as unqualified or non-legal personnel. 
However, the profession remains subordinate to that of solicitors. It is questionable 
whether APs have the capacity to deal with complex laws of evidence on without 
guidance from qualified lawyers. If they do, it seems difficult to explain why they have 
a lower status – and lower remuneration – than Crown Prosecutors. Cuts to legal aid 
and the increase in the number of unrepresented defendants52 mean that many 
magistrates’ court hearings take place without qualified solicitors or barristers 
representing either party. This gives credibility to fears of ‘de-lawyerisation’ of the 
magistrates’ court53 and concerns for the quality of justice in summary proceedings. 
                                                 
51 Andrew M Francis, ‘Legal Executives and the Phantom of Legal Professionalism: The Rise and Rise of 
the Third Branch of the Legal Profession?’ (2002) 9 International Journal of the Legal Profession 5. 
52 There are no official figures for unrepresented defendants in the magistrates’ court, but a recent 
report by the charity Transform Justice suggests an increase: Penelope Gibbs, ‘Justice Denied? The 
Experience of Unrepresented Defendants in the Criminal Courts’ (Transform Justice 2016) 
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